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The Trial of Jacob Benjamin, Supplier to the French Army, 1792-93
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Ronald Schechter

Introduction
On November 8, 1792 Deputy Pierre-Joseph Cambon addressed his fellow
lawmakers in the National Convention, the newly-formed legislature of a French
Republic that was barely one month old and at war with formidable foreign enemies. He
spoke in his capacity as a member of the Finance Committee, and he had bad news about
how the nation was spending its money for the provisioning of its armies. Specifically,
he reported that his committee “has charged me with denouncing to you numerous
fraudulent contracts agreed upon by [Jacques] Vincent, Chief Pay Commissioner for the
Army of the South.” Vincent had paid “nearly twice as much as the ordinary market
price” for provisions, and Cambon promised to prove this by showing the deputies two
agreements the commissioner had contracted with someone Cambon simply called “le
juif Benjamin,” or “the Jew Benjamin.”
Both contracts had been signed in September, 1792. One was for 500 cavalry
horses, which Jacob Benjamin sold the army for 720 livres each or 360,000 livres
altogether. The other contract was even larger. It was “for the provisioning of
Briançon,” a fortressed Alpine city constructed by Louis XIV’s military engineer Vauban
in the seventeenth century, “and the forts that depend on it.” In this deal Benjamin sold
8000 pounds of salt beef and 3600 pounds of salt pork. He also sold 300 sheep, 24,600
pounds of rice, 48,000 pounds of dried vegetables, 30,000 pounds of potatoes, 192,000
pints of wine, 1200 pounds of tobacco, 6000 pipes for smoking the tobacco, 12,800 pairs

of linen stockings and the same number of shoes. This agreement was worth
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approximately 400,000 livres. 1
Although Cambon did not provide a basis for comparison, he claimed that
Benjamin had overcharged the army, and he blamed Commissioner Vincent for signing
off on the deals. Other deputies shared Cambon’s indignation, and at the end of the
session the lawmakers called for Vincent and Benjamin to be summoned to the bar of the
Convention to account for their actions. 2
Thus began a cause célèbre that occupied a great deal of the Convention’s time
and energy over the course of two months and ended in a criminal trial of both Benjamin
and Vincent in Lyon. This case, and the documentation it generated, reveal an
extraordinary situation. In 1791, following much debate, the National Assembly had
removed the legal barriers separating Jews and Gentiles, and the very next year the
French government was relying to an astonishing degree on a single Jewish entrepreneur
to supply its imperiled armies. While Cambon mentioned two contracts worth over
750,000 livres, other documents (now in the Archives départementales du Rhône) reveal
that Benjamin did approximately four million livres worth of business with the Army of
the South alone, and that he also supplied two other armies: the Army of Rhine and the
Army of the Center. Not only might all this business have made Benjamin one of the
richest people in France, it also indicates that he shares credit with other, more famous

1

Jérôme Mavidal, et al., eds., Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, première série (1787–1799), 101
vols (Paris: 1867-2005), vol. 53, 309. The prices for each item were as follows: salt beef at 27 sous (one
livre, 7 sous) per pound; salt pork at 36 sous, 6 deniers per pound; sheep (mutton) at 23 sous per pound;
rice at 66 livres per quintal (100 pounds); dried vegetables at 34 livres, 10 sous per quintal; potatoes at 9
livres, 5 sous per quintal; wine at 18 sous, 6 deniers per pint; tobacco at 18 sous per livres; pipes at 9
deniers each; stockings at 13 livres per pair; and shoes at 13 livres per pair. There were 20 sous per livre
and 12 deniers per sou.
2
Archives parlementaires, vol. 53, 309-11.
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“architects of victory” such as Lazare Carnot. 3 It is worth remembering that the Army of
the Center, disbanded after the famous Battle of Valmy, had saved France from the
Prussians, and that the Army of the Rhine (for which the Marseillaise was composed)
carried the war into Germany itself, conquering the cities of Mainz, Landau, Speyer and
Worms. Meanwhile the Army of the South protected France from allies of the deposed
Bourbon dynasty in Italy by annexing Savoy. Contemporary documents suggest that
many thousands of the men in these armies were eating food, wearing clothing and
sleeping in tents provided by le juif Benjamin.
If only for these reasons, Jacob Benjamin should be known to students of
French and Jewish history alike. 4 Yet there is still more to his significance. There is
evidence that Benjamin was part of a larger but historiographically overlooked network
of Jewish businessmen who supplied the army. Benjamin partnered with at least five

major Jewish entrepreneurs, and he had 300 préposés or agents working for him. Though
it is impossible to know how many of them were Jewish, it would be surprising if
Benjamin’s coreligionists did not make up a large contingent of his enterprise. Among
the Jews who participated in Benjamin’s business was his wife, who published an open
letter to the Convention—probably the first publication in France by a Jewish woman—
in which she defended her husband’s conduct and simultaneously revealed a remarkable
familiarity with the details of his business. Benjamin’s Jewish network affords a new
perspective on emancipation. Historians, myself included, have tended to see

3

I am grateful to Gail Bossenga of Elizabethtown College for suggesting the applicability of the term
“architect of victory” to Benjamin.
4
The only mention I have been able to find of Benjamin in the secondary literature on the French
Revolution is a brief discussion in Jean Jaurès’s multivolume Histoire socialiste de la Révolution Française
(Paris, 1901-1907), vol. 3, 299-300. The only mention I have been able to find in the Jewish historiography
is half a sentence in Z[osa] Szajkowski, “French Jews in the Armed Forces during the Revolution of 1789,”
Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research, vol. 26 (1957): 156.

emancipation in terms of the acquisition of political rights, but the case of Benjamin
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shows that more was at stake than the ability to vote and serve in public office. Benjamin
and his Jewish colleagues no doubt appreciated these indicators of belonging to the
French nation, but at a more concrete, practical, everyday level the Revolution provided
them with a livelihood. Above all, the story of Jacob Benjamin reveals a great deal about
Jewish-Gentile relations in the immediate aftermath of emancipation. Specifically, it
reveals the weakness of antisemitism in 1792 and 1793. Although some revolutionaries
referred to le juif Benjamin, anti-Jewish prejudice was not sufficient to convict the Jewish
supplier. Nor did his acquittal spark any perceptible antisemitic response.

The Convention Investigates Benjamin
Benjamin appeared before the Convention on November 13. There he came face
to face with a formidable array of revolutionary deputies. The encounter began when
Hérault de Séchelles, President of the Convention (and future member of the Committee
of Public Safety), read the arraignment decree and “invite[d] [Benjamin] to present his
means of defense.” Benjamin responded by highlighting his expenses, citing, for
example, the high costs of transporting goods to an army that was “dispersed over a
radius of 120 leagues [414 miles].” Even when he had supplied a fixed encampment,
such as the fortress of Briançon, he had to pay dearly for transportation. “Everyone
knows,” he told the deputies, “that to transport a quintal [100 pounds] of merchandise
from Lyon to Briançon now costs 18 livres,” adding, “[W]hen it is necessary to supply in
a hurry everything is more expensive; that is a truth that cannot be denied.” Benjamin
also invoked the satisfaction of the soldiers, declaring, “I abide by the soldiers; they will

say how I served them and if they are happy.” He added that certificates of reception
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showed that “my supplies were all of good quality,” and he finished his initial statement
by saying, “I await with confidence and without fear the verdict of the Convention.”
Cambon was not convinced. He claimed that, according to the Minister of War
himself, salt pork was selling for 10 sous per pound in assignats (the revolutionary paper
money that was subject to inflation), whereas Benjamin had charged 37 sous, half
payable in specie. He ridiculed Benjamin’s claim to have favorable certificates of
reception, asserting that “at excessive prices … such certificates are not difficult to
obtain” and implying that Benjamin had purchased them through bribery. At this point
“many members” of the Convention, according to the Archives parlementaires, called for
Benjamin to be placed under arrest. Benjamin insisted that the price he asked for salt
pork was at or even below market value. But his main argument was that General
Montesquiou, commander of the Army of the South at the time of the contracts, had
agreed to his terms. He asserted:
I am a supplier; the general either had the right to deal with me, or he did not; if
he had the right, it is up to me to fulfill my engagements … if he did not have the
right, why did he deal with me?
Benjamin concluded, “[I]t was necessary for me to fulfill my promises, which I did; the
nation has nothing more to ask of me.” This statement provoked “prolonged murmurs.”
Several members of the Convention responded to Benjamin’s statements. LouisPierre Manuel insisted, “Let Benjamin go to the Committee of Surveillance, [and] he will
say what bribes he dispensed.” The future member of the Committee of Public Safety
Jacques Nicolas Billaud-Varenne hinted darkly, “I have facts to expose between the
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suppliers and the generals; I will produce them at the committee.” Jean-Lambert Tallien,
also a future terroriste, declared:

Seals have been apposed to Benjamin’s papers, [and] we will discover later
whether he was not the front for some generals; but for the moment, I observe that
the discussion which is about to open up is too interesting for the members of the
Committee of Surveillance to be absent from it.

He concluded, “I ask that the Convention send Benjamin Jacob [sic] to the joint
committees on finance, war and general security to be heard, and order that he remain in
the meantime under arrest.” The Convention decreed Tallien’s proposal, then moved on
to the business of deciding the fate of another detained person, namely the king. 5
That same day, Benjamin was interrogated by Deputy Joseph-Mathurin Musset,
who represented the joint committee. The resulting report, signed by Musset, was
subsequently sent to the Criminal Tribunal in Lyon and is now in the Archives
Départementales du Rhône. It reveals a great deal about the nature and extent of
Benjamin’s business. When asked about his contracts with war ministers, Benjamin
answered that in a contract with the Comte de Narbonne he had agreed to deliver shoes
and stockings (he did not say how many) for the Army of the Rhine and the Army of the
Center. (Narbonne was a Girondin War Minister who had emigrated after the fall of the
monarchy on August 10, 1792.) Benjamin had also signed an agreement with Pierre
Marie de Grave —who had been War Minister from March 9, 1792 to May 9, 1792—and
who had contracted him to supply “twenty and some thousand shirts.” Finally, he had
made a deal for the supply of meat with Minister of War Joseph Servan in June. These

5

Archives parlementaires, vol. 53, 384-5.

contracts were all in addition to the deals Benjamin made with Vincent under the
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authorization of General Montesquiou.
Musset’s interrogation also tells us about Benjamin’s business contacts.
Benjamin denied the allegation (made three times by Musset) that his father-in-law had
lent Narbonne 150,000 livres between 1786 and 1792, thereby implying that the
discredited War Minister had had a conflict of interest when negotiating with Benjamin.
Benjamin, however, revealed a network of business associates including his father-inlaw, his younger brother, a partner named Emmanuel Ducas and another named Chemol
(spelled ‘Schemolle’ in other documents). 6
On November 18 it was Vincent’s turn to face the Convention. He told the
deputies of a contract he had signed with Benjamin for 400 soldiers’ tents and one for
1800 beds for the soldiers stationed in Briançon. Vincent had also purchased 30,000 ells
(45,000 feet) of cloth for soldiers’ uniforms, as well as shirts, hats, and leggings. When
asked about the allegedly high prices he had agreed to pay for Benjamin’s supplies,
Vincent defended himself by claiming that he had bargained Benjamin down by 10 sous
per pair of leggings, and by 4 sous per pound of lamb, and that he also obtained a
discount on cloth for the soldiers’ uniforms. 7 When asked by Abbé Grégoire, the radical
priest and current President of the Convention, whether he knew of any “deals made
between Benjamin Jacob [sic] and General Montesquiou,” he answered:
I am profoundly humiliated by this question; my life is without a stain; I have no
knowledge of secret deals with General Montesquiou, and despite my friendship
for him, if he had made himself guilty, I would have denounced him myself.

6

“Interrogatoire de Jacob Benjamin du 13 9bre l’an 1er [de la République],” 39 L 21, Archives
Départementales du Rhône, Lyon. I am grateful to Etienne Faugier for photographing the documents
relating to the Benjamin case at the AD du Rhône and sending them to me electronically.
7
Archives parlementaires, vol. 53, 466-7.
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Despite his protestations of innocence, the Convention voted to keep Vincent under arrest
and to send him before the Committee of General Security. 8
The Convention became even more suspicious of Benjamin and Vincent when it
received a letter on November 20 from three of its deputies who had been sent as
observers to Lyon. These deputies—Charles-Jean-Marie Alquier, François Antoine de
Boissy d'Anglas and Louis Vitet—had recently visited the army’s storage facility in Lyon
and examined some of the supplies within it. They claimed to have scrutinized some of
the 200,000 pairs of shoes and 200,000 shirts that two other army suppliers (Lajard and
Lebrun) had delivered, and they judged these to have been of very poor quality. They
even sent six of the shirts to the Convention to prove how shoddy they were. It was not
clear whether or how Benjamin was involved in this deal, but the letter began by
denouncing “the enormity of the theft committed by Benjamin and his accomplices.” It
also claimed that in the contract that Benjamin and Vincent had signed for the delivery of
cloth (to be used in the production of uniforms) only the length, but not the width, had
been stipulated, leaving Benjamin with the option of skimping on the total amount. It
went on to claim that there was a vast conspiracy of army officials and suppliers to
defraud the Republic. After hearing the contents of the letter, numerous deputies
expressed outrage and called for severe measures against the accused. Jean-Bon-SaintAndré, who would later serve on the Committee of Public Safety, proclaimed, “It is only
the scaffold that will dispense justice to those men who show the barbarity of enriching
themselves at the expense of the unhappy soldiers of the Republic.” He called for an
indictment against Benjamin and Vincent and for wide powers of arrest for the deputies

8

Archives parlementaires, vol. 53, 384-5.

observing the situation in Lyon. The Convention voted in favor of his proposal, though
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the indictment would only be drawn up on December 25. It also voted to create a
commission of 24 deputies charged with investigating the contracts made between
provisioners and army officials. 9
To make matters worse, that same day President Grégoire announced that he had
just received a letter from Jean-Nicolas Pache, Minister of War, which would serve as “a
supplement to the general disturbance of the swindlers.” The letter announced that Pache
had sent the Convention “a pair of shoes, a shirt and numerous pairs of socks supplied to
the storage facility of Strasbourg by Jacob Benjamin.” These items, according to the
Minister of War, had been rejected by a commissioner from the Army of the Rhine who
was responsible for inspecting military supplies. Pache asserted that the shoes were “of
the worst quality,” that the shirt was “almost as coarse as packing-cloth,” and that the
socks were too thin. He also claimed that seals of approval from the Ministry of War had
been removed from letters and affixed onto the socks, thus fraudulently giving the
impression that the army had accepted the merchandise. He therefore saw it as his “duty
to denounce this new form of peculation to the Convention.” Pache’s letter prompted still
more comments about profiteering suppliers and corrupt army officials. 10 According to
the Archives Parlementaires 23 deputies spoke during the debates on army suppliers at
the November 20 session. Clearly the matter was of great interest to the Convention, and
the discussion might have continued even longer had Minister of Justice Roland not

9
10

Archives parlementaires, vol. 53, 489.
Several non-Jewish army suppliers were also denounced.

appeared with more pressing news: incriminating documents against the deposed king
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had been discovered in the Tuileries Palace. 11
On November 28 the Convention read another letter from its representatives in
Lyon. They had returned to the military storage facility and merchandise that had been
accepted by “guilty military commissioners and inspectors” was “recognized”
(presumably by Alquier, Boissy d'Anglas and Vitet themselves) as “of the worst quality.”
The implication was that military officials in charge of the storage facility and the experts
contracted to inspect the merchandise had been bribed. There is no record in the Archives
Parlementaires as to the response of the deputies in Paris, who spent much of the
November 28 session discussing the fate of Louis XVI, but for Benjamin the accusations
were clearly accumulating.
On December 7 the Committee on Legislation proposed sending Benjamin and
Vincent to the criminal tribunal of the Department of Rhône-et-Loire in Lyon. Up to this
point it had not been clear where the suspects would be tried, but trying them before the
Convention was obviously not practical considering that this assembly was now
functioning as court to a much more important trial: that of the deposed king. The
Convention accepted the committee’s recommendation, and Benjamin and Vincent
departed for Lyon, where they would be held in the jail of the Palais de Justice until their
trial. 12

11
12

Archives parlementaires, vol. 53, 491.
Archives parlementaires, vol. 54, 405.

Madame Benjamin Appeals to the Convention
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At some point between November 20 and December 7 an extraordinary
publication appeared: La femme de Jacob Benjamin à la Convention Nationale. This
undated 22-page pamphlet is historically valuable at several levels. It reveals the close
involvement of Benjamin’s wife (who did not provide her given name) in her husband’s
affairs and thereby gives a tantalizing glimpse into the role Jewish women may have
played in their families’ businesses. It is also probably the first publication in France
ever written by a Jewish woman. (Of course it is possible that Madame Benjamin had
help in composing the pamphlet.) Moreover, it demonstrates her skill in taking a legal
case to the tribunal of public opinion, a strategy that Sarah Maza has shown to have been
popular under the Old Regime. 13 Finally, it provides us with new information and new
perspectives on Benjamin’s business and corroborates evidence from other sources. The
open letter to the Convention began with an emotional appeal:
My husband is in irons by virtue of a decree of accusation that is based on
denunciations which have not been contradicted. The indictment has not been
drawn up; the tribunal that will judge him has not been determined, & yet no one
is communicating with him. He is in solitary confinement, & remains charged
with the execution of numerous deal[s]; obliged to follow a multitude of
operations of which he alone is the soul, he is unable to give any orders or to
undertake any correspondence. More than two hundred subaltern agents remain
under his orders, & he cannot supervise them.

Continuing in a patriotic tone, Madame Benjamin wrote, “He has provided immense
provisions to the nation,” but this meant that “the republic” had “a large responsibility”
toward him. More than 500,000 livres worth of provisions had already been delivered to
Briançon, but the Convention had cancelled these agreements, meaning that Benjamin

13

Sarah Maza, Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Causes Célèbres of Prerevolutionary France
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
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was not receiving payments. Meanwhile, every day “additional merchandise arrives from
all over, which he had to provide in advance, not being able to predict that his contracts
would be nullified.” Moreover, Benjamin had made agreements with subcontractors who
were now demanding to be paid. “All our fortune,” the petitioner continued, “& much
more, is therefore visibly absorbed by these vast enterprises.” She depicted a “frightful
chaos” in which “numerous creditors are still fighting over the remains” of Benjamin’s
enterprise while her husband “trembles in a narrow prison.”
Alluding to the effects of anti-Jewish sentiment, Madame Benjamin wrote, “I
know that terrible prejudices still rise up against us, that a baneful suspicion calls into
disfavor all the business ventures of my husband.” She nonetheless expressed confidence
that “the convention is too just to allow itself to be carried away by appearances that are
often deceptive.” It would “not permit us to be ruined, if our ruin must be the
consequence of a precipitous judgment rather than of real crimes on our part.” The
petitioner was asking for two things: first, for a speedy trial in order for Jacob to prove
his innocence and then return to his business; and second, for a reinstatement of the
“contracts of Briançon” that had been nullified on November 8.
To prove that Jacob had a record of supplying quality products, his wife gave an
account of deals he had made with the government prior to the Briançon agreement. As
early as March, 1792, when war was on the horizon but had not been declared, he had
“contracted with the minister of war for various supplies of socks & shoes for Metz &
Strasbourg, the shoes at 5 liv[res] 8 s[ous] per pair, payable in assignats.” In May the
government again bought socks and shoes from Benjamin, in addition to “twenty-five
thousand shirts at 6 liv[res] each, [payable] in assignats.” No one had complained about

“the clauses in these initial contracts,” which were not under investigation by the
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Convention, “nor about the exactitude & the loyalty of the deliveries that followed.”
“[I]nfinite precautions” had been taken “to assure the quality of this merchandise.”
Indeed, her husband bought “one hundred ten thousand pairs of shoes” for resale to the
army but only accepted them after careful inspection by experts he had hired to assure
their quality. Interestingly, Madame Benjamin asserted that “the majority” of the shoes
had been “made in a workshop that he established in his house.” Outside his house,
many in the Marais neighborhood in Paris were involved with “the production of some of
the shirts.”
Madame Benjamin was aware of the Convention’s complaints about the price
Benjamin charged for his meat. She responded by describing his contract with War
Minister Servan on June 11, 1792. Benjamin and Servan had agreed to a price of 10
sous, six deniers per pound, but when he travelled to Lyon to begin his deliveries, “he
found the troops billeted over the space of one hundred twenty leagues; rather than being
united in an army corp, as the agreement had stipulated.” Transportation costs threatened
to be ruinous. When Benjamin informed the Minister of War of this hardship, Servan
persuaded him “to supply provisionally.” Madame Benjamin painted the picture of a
supremely patriotic husband:
Benjamin did not refuse anything, & despite the difficulty of spreading his
supplies here & there, from Lyon to Antibes, & even as far as Perpignan, he did
not think it right to calculate the losses that he was going to suffer.

But the deputies did not have to take Madame Benjamin at her word:
To say how my husband acquitted himself of this burdensome service is to repeat
what the entire army of the south has so energetically attested in a declaration that
is assuredly not suspect.

14
Indeed, Benjamin had received “great praise” from the soldiers at Chambéry, and his
wife predicted that they would continue to support “a servant of the patrie who is crushed
by misfortune.”
As to the provisioning of “the fortress of Briançon” and that of “Embrun & of
Mont-Dauphin, which are still further away,” Benjamin was offered this commission
precisely because he had done such a good job of supplying meat to the Army of the
South. But if it had been difficult to provision a dispersed army, supplying Briançon and
its neighboring forts was even more burdensome and risky. Madame Benjamin explained
that Briançon was “built on the summit of a very high mountain” and that transportation
costs were correspondingly high, particularly during the winter when muleteers had to
navigate narrow, snow-covered paths.
Madame Benjamin quoted Jean-Pierre Lacombe-Saint-Michel, a deputy who had
been tasked with observing the operations of the Army of the South and who had
approved of the contract for provisioning Briançon:
Montesquiou sent us the contract with Jacob Benjamin to furnish the army with
all the goods that it need[ed]. The battalions were arriving in abundance; that part
of the republic was threatened: the need was pressing, the safety of the patrie was
at stake. We did not hesitate to give our authorization. 14

The rush to supply Briançon only added to the cost.
Meanwhile, the contract did not protect Benjamin against losses or damage to his
merchandise. The petitioner cited the risk of bandits attacking the caravans or storage
facilities. She also pointed to “epizootic diseases, principally among sheep assembled in
great quantities,” and the “terrible ravages they almost always cause.” Benjamin had to
14

Cf. Archives parlementaires, vol. 53, 310.

charge higher prices than usual “to indemnify himself against all these losses.” The
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author noted that in “all contracts that are aleatory or mixed with risks” the “laws
authorize [the price] to exceed the intrinsic value of the thing in question.” She pointed to
“maritime contracts” in which “the price of risks is computed,” and asked, “[H]as one
ever made a crime of day laborers who raise the price of freight transportation above all
in time of war, of insurers who raise insurance premiums?” Nor were the risks to
Benjamin’s merchandise hypothetical. At the time Benjamin agreed to supply Briançon,
“in the first days of September, part of the territory of the Republic was invaded by a
powerful army.” Proof of the enormity of the risk Benjamin undertook was that “no
supplier entered into competition” for the contract. Nor did he need the money. He had
“great means, an acquired fortune, rather extensive credit,” but “he did not hesitate to
expose it all to political uncertainty.”
Madame Benjamin went on to defend the prices her husband charged for specific
articles. For example, she justified the sale of salt beef at 27 sous per pound by noting
that “[e]veryone knows that before salting meat it is necessary to remove the large bones:
the operation of salting requires infinite care.” As to the salt pork that sold for 34 sous
per livre, this was because it needed to be delivered in September, whereas “pigs are only
slaughtered two months later” and “purchases made before the time of abundance were
necessarily more expensive.”

15

Whether Madame Benjamin’s pamphlet had any impact on public opinion is
impossible to know, but for the purposes of this essay its value lies in its detailed
description of the risks with which Jacob Benjamin’s business was fraught.

15

La femme de Jacob Benjamin a la Convention Nationale ([Paris, 1792]), 1-13, 22.
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Benjamin in Lyon

Benjamin arrived in Lyon on December 19 and was imprisoned in the Maison de
Justice while awaiting his trial at the Criminal Tribunal of the Rhône-et-Loire
Department. On Christmas Day the Convention completed its indictment, which accused
Benjamin of selling meat in one contract for up to three times the price he charged in a
previous agreement. 16 Moreover, the indictment charged him with:
[H]aving concluded with Commissioner Vincent agreements that were fraudulent
and prejudicial to the interests of the Republic; having delivered shoes and shirts
of the worst quality and having in this way stolen the funds of the Republic and
compromised the external security of the State. 17

These were serious charges, almost as serious as treason, and in time of war might have
carried a death sentence.
On January 7, 1793 Benjamin was questioned by Jean-Bernard-François Cozon,
president of the Criminal Tribunal, and in the presence of Broches, the public
prosecutor. 18 The transcript of this interrogation is remarkable, both for the amount of
detail it provides regarding Benjamin’s enterprise and as a testimony to Cozon’s
willingness to listen to the defendant’s lengthy explanations of his business practices.

16

The indictment notes that according to an earlier agreement with the Minister of War, Benjamin was
“obligated to furnish meat to 25[,000] or 30,000 men who were going to compose the Army of the South.”
Archives Parlementaires, vol. 55, 425.
17
Archives parlementaires, vol. 55, 425.
18
“L’an deux de la République et le sept Janvier mil sept cent quatre vingt treize, nous Jean Bernard
François Cozon président du tribunal criminel du département du Rone [sic] & Loire d’après l’envoy fait
par le ministre de la justice de l’acte d’accusation porté par la Convention N[ationa]lle contre Jacob
Benjamin et Vincent Comm[issai]re ordonnateur avons fait amener en l’auditoire du palais de justice le
prévenu cy après nommé et l’avons interrogé en présence de l’accusateur public sur les faits énoncés
audit acte d’accusation, et sur les preuves qu’il peut judiquer pour la justification ainsy qu’il suit,” 39 L 21.

17

When asked about his contract for the provisioning of Briançon, Benjamin noted
that it was “under the authority of General Montesquiou” and with the approval of the
three deputies from the Legislative Assembly (the precursor to the Convention) whose
job it was to supervise the Army of the South. 19 He confirmed that Commissioner
Vincent had succeeded in negotiating a reduction in the price of mutton from 27 to 23
sous per pound. When Cozon asked about any previous deals Benjamin had made with
War Minister Servant, Benjamin discussed the contract from June 11 “for the supply of
meat to the entire Army of the South.” According to this agreement he was to:
[D]eliver the meat at the price of 10 sous 3 deniers per pound if the head and the
pluck [fraissure] were weighed with the meat, and at the price of 10 sous 10
deniers if the head and the pluck remained in my possession, and finally [at the
price] of 10 sous 9 deniers if the heads and pluck were given for free to the
soldiers. 20

Cozon asked Benjamin what accounted for “this enormous difference between the
prices fixed by the deal of June 11 and those of the deal of September 3” for the supply of
Briançon. He then listened patiently to an extended explanation. Benjamin explained
that fresh meat (the object of the contract of June 11) was always cheaper than salted
meat, since the former transported itself whereas the latter required the expensive
mediation of carters. Moreover, fresh meat “preserves practically all of its weight,”
whereas salted meat “loses one third [of its weight] through drying, not to mention the
large bones that must be removed, and which are a pure loss to the supplier.” Benjamin
19

The deputies in question were Jean-Pierre Lacombe-Saint-Michel, Thomas-Augustin de Gasparin and
Jean Pascal Rouyer. Under pressure in the Convention for having approved the unpopular contracts, these
deputies denied having agreed on any price and shifted the responsibility to General Montesquiou, who was
already the object of severe criticism for an unpopular peace treaty he had concluded with the Republic of
Geneva. For the legislative debate on this topic see Archives parlementaires, vol. 53, 310-1.
20
The pluck consisted of the heart, liver, lungs and other edible soft contents of the animal’s body cavities.
The difference between the price of 10 sous, 3 deniers if the pluck and head were included but not given to
the soldiers and the price of 10 sous, 9 deniers if these parts were given to the soldiers constituted a heavy
subsidy by Benjamin of any such gift. It may have contributed to his popularity with the soldiers.

18

added that for the deal with Servan he received all of his payments in specie, whereas in
the contract with Vincent half of his payment was in assignats that lost their value
quickly due to inflation. Finally, in the deal of June 11 Benjamin had been indemnified

for livestock that died of epidemic disease or was seized “by superior force,” whereas the
September deal lacked any such guarantee.
Cozon seemed satisfied with this explanation and did not pursue the issue. When
Benjamin recalled the contract for 500 horses, Cozon did not ask about the price, which
he must have believed to be reasonable. He did ask Benjamin to explain the accusation
that he had sold cloth to the army on the basis of length but without stipulating the width.
Benjamin replied:
The width of the cloth is not determined in this deal, but it is in a previous
contract presented by another supplier, 21 accepted by the commissioners of the
Legislative Assembly, and I took it upon myself in the margin of this contract to
take the width determined in [the previous] contract as the rule for my supply, and
to give as a result cloth of the width of one ell and more.

Proof of this was in “the reception reports” written by the army official responsible for
accepting supplies. When asked whether he had supplied any shirts to the army, he noted
that his “agent” Cerf Dessau had done so and that he (Benjamin) “stood surety” for him.
As to the supply of shoes, Benjamin replied, “I never made any deals for the supply of
shoes in Lyon. I undertook an engagement in the deal relating to the provisioning of
Briançon to supply stockings and shoes at a price of thirteen livres per pair of stockings
and shoes together, to be delivered to Briançon,” though that deal was “no longer in
effect” due to nullification by the Convention. Cozon then asked, “Are you aware that
your deals of last September 3 and 23 have been annulled as fraudulent by decree of the

21

This supplier was probably Cerf Dessau, who will be discussed later in this essay.

National Convention?” Benjamin did not simply answer this question but defended
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himself, and Cozon did not interrupt him:

Yes, I am aware from the public papers and because this fact is stated in the
indictment but the decree pronouncing this annulment was never shown to me. I
submit moreover that these two deals are not at all fraudulent, nor are they
detrimental to the interests of the Republic. They are not fraudulent, because I did
not employ any fraud in having them accepted, as the commissioners of the
Legislative Assembly were empowered, as was the General [Montesquiou], not to
agree to my contracts. They are not detrimental to the interests of the Republic,
because the Republic could not hope to find suppliers who at this time could
supply for a lower price at their peril and risk and without guarantee.

When Cozon was finished with his interrogation, he informed Benjamin of his right to
choose “two friends or counsels” to represent him. Benjamin chose a lawyer named Bret.
The following day, January 8, Benjamin submitted a petition to the “the citizen
judges of the criminal tribunal.” It was written in the third person, but this was
conventional for legal petitions and does not mean that he did not write it himself, though
his lawyer Bret may have authored it in part or in full. In any event, Benjamin himself
signed it and there is no signature from Bret. While the petition only asks for Benjamin’s
case to be heard at the next court session, it also reveals a defense strategy that combines
appeals to existing statutes, humanitarian principles and patriotism.
The petition began by narrating Benjamin’s predicament. On November 20, 1792
“the National Convention decreed that there was cause for an accusation against the
petitioner,” but “[a] few days prior, called to the bar of the assembly, having gone there,
[been] interrogated, [and] sent to the joint committee, the petitioner manifested his
innocence and obtained the liberty of his person.” But the “decree of accusation” issued
on November 20 “reattached his chains” and Benjamin “accepted them” since this was
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“the will of the representatives of his compatriots.” The petition gave the impression that
Benjamin had a choice in the matter, asserting, “Jacob Benjamin only burdened himself
with these chains in order to obey the law.” Yet “if that law was capable of being
invoked against him, he had the right to invoke it in turn.”
Accordingly, the petition invoked article 19, title 6 of the penal code, which
“prescribes that the public prosecutor immediately after the interrogation shall be

required to make haste such that the accused may be judged at the first jury assembly that
follows.” (Underlining in the original.) That would have been on December 15, but by
that date “no tribunal was yet indicated … and therefore the petitioner’s detention was
perpetuated beyond the prescribed term.” Benjamin was “the victim of arbitrary
treatment.” The next scheduled session of the criminal tribunal was scheduled for
January 15, and this “irrevocably became the jury that must pronounce the fate of the
petitioner.” Benjamin was eager to have his day in court:
Far from asking for a dismissal, the petitioner saw with satisfaction the instant of
his judgment approaching; his family, his business partners, three hundred agents
whom he has to supervise from the depths of his prison, he dares and can say it,
the entire army to which he has supplied the subsistence, all are waiting and
counting on this moment, their hope must not be deceived, that hope is founded
on the law.

Thus, the nation itself and the principles that justified its existence depended on a speedy
trial—and implicitly, Benjamin’s acquittal.
The petition acknowledged that the public prosecutor had “the right to ask for a
prorogation,” but if he did so he “would have to expose the motives behind his request.”
But “what would be these motives? Is there one that in the scales of justice could for a
moment serve as a counterweight to what reason, humanity, truth demand?” On the
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contrary, “The prorogation that the public prosecutor would request would be on his part

a formal admission of the frivolity of the accusation, which he is incapable of defending.”
To the possible objection that more documentary evidence against Benjamin was
forthcoming, the petitioner remarked that “to ask for a delay on the basis of this hope
would be on the part of the public prosecutor to censure the accusation itself and to say
that it was at least inconsiderate.” Benjamin (or Bret) appealed again to patriotism and
the rule of law: “since the petitioner has been consigned to your authority, an entire army
beseeches his presence, three hundred agents his supervision and he who is in irons the
execution of the laws.” He therefore “request[ed] … that it please you, Citizens, to
ordain that the petitioner will appear before the jury of judgment convoked for the 15th of
the current month.” 22
Vincent, who had been imprisoned for as long as Benjamin, was also eager to
have his day in court, and he also petitioned to have his case judged on January 15. The
public prosecutor, however, asked for a prorogation to the next scheduled session of the
criminal court in February. As Benjamin’s petition had anticipated, he cited delays in
obtaining the necessary documentation. 23

Business Records Seized from Benjamin’s House
Meanwhile the joint committee established to investigate irregularities in army
provisioning sought to build a case against Benjamin and Vincent. It had Benjamin’s
house in Paris raided and sent his business records to the Minister of Justice, who in turn
22
Petition from Jacob Benjamin to the judges of the Criminal Tribunal of the Rhône-et-Loire Department,
January 8, 1793, 39 L 21.
23
Petition from Jacques Vincent to the judges of the Criminal Tribunal of the Rhône-et-Loire Department,
January 8, 1793, 39 L 21; and Petition from Broches to the judges of the Criminal Tribunal of the Rhôneet-Loire Department, January 8, 1793, 39 L 21.
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sent many of them to Broches in Lyon, asking him to have the case tried “at this month’s
session.” 24 Broches then reversed his request of January 8 and asked Cozon to schedule
the trial for January 22. 25 The documents, now in box 39 L 21 at the Archives
départementales du Rhône, reveal still more about the extent and nature of Benjamin’s
business. Particularly interesting, in this regard, are copies of contracts that Benjamin
signed with representatives of France’s armed forces. Some of these deals—for the
supply of cavalry horses and the provisioning of Briançon, for example—are already
known from the Convention’s discussion of them. But other contracts provide new
information.

Specifically, the June 11 deal between Benjamin and War Minister Servan for the
supply of meat is among the documents. This deal was already publically known thanks
to Benjamin’s statements before the National Convention and his wife’s published plea
on his behalf. Benjamin had also mentioned it to Musset during his interrogation in
Paris, and again to Cozon while under questioning in Lyon. But the contract itself, a 21article document, reveals more than the agreed upon price of the meat. Article one
indicates that Benjamin was required to provide meat for the soldiers in the Army of the
South wherever they were “assembled in an army, whether in France or in foreign
countries.” Article two shows that Benjamin was obligated to provide one half pound of
meat every day for every soldier in the Army of the South from July 1 to December 31,
1792. In other words, it literally charged Benjamin with feeding an army. The contract
estimated that there were between 28,000 and 30,000 soldiers in that army. One quarter
of the cattle were to be oxen (boeufs) and one quarter cows “of high quality,” the oxen
24

Dominique-Joseph Garat, Minister of Justice, to Broches, public prosecutor, January 12, 1793, 39 L 21.
Broches, public prosecutor, to Jean-Bernard-François Cozon, presiding judge of the Criminal Tribunal of
the Rhône-et-Loire Department, January 18, 1793, 39 L 21.
25

weighing at least 500 pounds a head (and the weight of the cows undetermined).
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According to article three the hides, tallow and offal were to remain in Benjamin’s
possession. (Benjamin also sold candles, perhaps using some of these by-products of
slaughtered animals, and his business partner Cerf Dessau sold leather goods to the
army. 26) Article four required Benjamin to pay any duties on cattle that were brought into
France from abroad, indicating an international dimension to the business. Article five
provided Benjamin with guards “for the security of the livestock,” corroborating his and
his wife’s claims about the risks to the supply, and an area for the butchering of the
animals and the distribution of the meat. Article seven reveals that Benjamin sent his
own apprentice butchers and other “employees” to the camps, but that they were to be
lodged there or nearby at no cost. Article eight confirms Benjamin’s claim to Cozon that
there were three rates for the meat depending on its quality and whether the “pluck” was
to be given as a gift to the soldiers. The contract also supports Benjamin’s contention
that the price of meat was lower in the agreement with Servan in part because the state
indemnified Benjamin for possible losses. Article eleven required the government to pay
Benjamin 290 livres for each ox and 175 livres for each cow that was seized “by major
force” or died from “epidemic disease,” again revealing the risky nature of his
enterprise. 27

26

The contract to provision Briançon included tallow candles (chandelles). “Approvisionnement des
places de Briançon &c.,” September 3, 1792, 39 L 21. For Dessau’s contract with the army, to which
Benjamin stood surety, see “Conditions aux quelles le sieur Cerf Dessaut [sic] s’oblige à fournir vingt mille
chemises, dix mille chapeaux, dix mill[e] gibernes et avec leurs bandrieres, trois mille bandrieres de sabres,
et dix milles paires de guêtres pour le service de l’armée du Midy,” September 6, 1792, 39 L 21.
27
“Conditions sous les quelles Jacob Benjamin demeurant à Paris rue Ste Avoye s’oblige comme pour les
progrès deniers et affaires de l’État envers M Joseph Servan ministre et secrétaire d’état ayant le
département de la guerre de fournir la viande aux troupes de la nation françoise qui pourroient être
rassemblées soit sur les frontières soit en pays étranger soit enfin dans les places et ce jusqu’au 1er janvier
1793,” 39 L 21.

How much would Benjamin have been earned on the basis of this contract? At

24

the upper end, if the army bought only the highest quality meat at 10 livres 10 deniers per
pound for 30,000 soldiers, it would have been obligated to pay him 1,494,540 livres. At
the lower end, if the army had only purchased the lower-quality meat at 10 livres per
pound for 28,000 soldiers, it would have paid Benjamin 1,288,000 livres. 28 Benjamin
received 300,000 livres in advance. 29
Other contracts shed light on Benjamin’s clothing and cloth supply business. On
August 5, 1792 Benjamin agreed to sell the Army of the South 25,000 shirts at seven
livres, five sous a piece. That deal was worth 206,250 livres. 30 Even larger deals were for
the supply of cloth out of which uniforms would be made. In one agreement dated August
25, 1792 Benjamin sold 30,000 ells of cloth. In return he received over 600,000 livres
(627,500 livres). 31 Just two weeks later he signed an agreement to sell 32,000 ells of cloth
for 708,000 livres. 32 Benjamin also sold the army tents. Vincent had mentioned the sale
of tents in his testimony to the Convention, but the contract itself reveals more about the
sale. It shows that Benjamin sold a thousand tents for 224,000 livres. 33

28

Benjamin recalled in his testimony to Cozon that the meat weighed without the pluck was 10 sous, 3
deniers per pound, whereas the contract reveals that he had actually sold it for less: 10 sous per pound.
29
“Conditions sous les quelles Jacob Benjamin demeurant à Paris rue Ste Avoye s’oblige comme pour les
progrès deniers et affaires de l’État envers M Joseph Servan ministre et secrétaire d’état ayant le
département de la guerre de fournir la viande aux troupes de la nation françoise qui pourroient être
rassemblées soit sur les frontières soit en pays étranger soit enfin dans les places et ce jusqu’au 1er janvier
1793,” 39 L 21.
30
“Armée du Midy. 5. Août 1782. Soumission.” Archives départementales du Rhône, 39 L 21. Unless
otherwise indicated, all further information in this paper comes from carton 39 L 21.
31
An ell is a foot and a half. Therefore, 30,000 ells are 45,000 feet. The width of the cloth varied, but it
was always at least one ell, thus in this deal Benjamin sold at least 67,500 square feet of cloth. “Armée du
midi. Habillem[en]ts. 25 Août 1792. Soumission,” 39 L 21.
32
“Conditions aux quelles le sieur Jacob Benjamin s’oblige à fournir trente deux mille aulnes de drap, pour
l’habillement de ce bataillon de Volontaire et Nationaux,” September 10, 1792, 39 L 21.
33
These were large tents. The smallest were 144 square feet, or twelve by twelve feet. (There were 400 of
these.) In addition, 600 tents were 216 square feet each. Finally there were 200 officers’ tents. The
contract does not say how large these were, though they were almost three times as expensive as the small
tents. “Soumission,” September 15, 1792, 39 L 21.

In all, the contracts in the court dossier show deals worth at least 3.9 million
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livres. (See Table 1.) Of course, we cannot know what Benjamin’s profit margins were,
but even if they were as low as 10 percent, Benjamin would have earned at least 390,000
livres in less than three and a half months. This alone would have made Benjamin one of
the highest-earning people in France. By comparison, a rich landowning aristocrat with
an annual income of 100,000 livres would have seemed quite modest, and in any event by
the end of the summer of 1792 most of that class had already emigrated. 34 Moreover, the
contracts in the court file are only those relating to the supply of the Army of the South.
We know from Musset’s interrogation of Benjamin in Paris that he also conducted
business with the Army of the Rhine and the Army of the Center. If contracts with these
other armies were of comparable value—and only a thorough search of War Ministry
archives will establish whether this was the case—then Benjamin would have had done
roughly 12 million livres worth of business with the state in 1792. 35

Table 1.
Contract
Meat supply for the
entire Army of the
South
25,000 shirts
30,000 ells of cloth
Provisioning of
Briançon
34

Date (1792)
June 11

Value (in livres)
1,288,000 to
1,494,540

August 5
August 25
September 3

206,250
627,500
At least 500,000 36

According to Timothy Tackett, the marquis de Lafayette had an income of 108,000 livres in 1778. Only
a few aristocrats had higher incomes than that. Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French
National Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789-1790) (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996), 30.
35
Still more evidence of lucrative contracts with other armies comes from Madame Benjamin’s open letter
to the Convention in which it is reported that Benjamin sold 100,000 shirts to the military. The August 5
contract with the Army of the South was only for 25,000 shirts, which suggests that the other 75,000 shirts
were sold to other armies.
36
The exact amount cannot be estimated, since the sheep were sold by head and their weight is unknown.
Assuming that the average sheep weighed 200 pounds, the contract would have been worth 538,731 livres.

30,000 ells of cloth
1000 tents
500 horses

September 10
September 15
September 23

708,000
224,000
360,000
Total (lowest
estimate)
3,913,750
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The papers seized by the Convention also reveal Benjamin’s connections with
other Jewish businessmen. Specifically, the name Cerf Dessau (a recognizably Jewish
name) appears frequently in the documents. (Benjamin mentioned Dessau while under
interrogation by Cozon.) Benjamin stood surety for two contracts worth more than
850,000 livres altogether in which Dessau supplied the army. 37 Another of Benjamin’s
associates, Isaac Hesse, was likely Jewish. He stood surety for the contract (worth
708,000 livres) in which Benjamin agreed to provide cloth for soldiers’ uniforms. 38
When Benjamin needed someone to co-sign his agreement to sell the army 500 cavalry
horses, he chose the Jewish businessman Bernard Alcan. 39 In his challenging quest to
provide daily meat rations for roughly 30,000 men, Benjamin formed a corporation with
two other Jewish men: Aaron Schemolle (the “Chemol” mentioned in the interrogation by
Musset and Benjamin’s neighbor on the rue Capon in Paris) and Jacob Trenelle. 40 We
can only guess at how many of Benjamin’s 300 agents (préposés) were Jewish. Clearly
Benjamin could not have done his work without a network of Jewish merchants.

37

Contract between Cerf Dessau and General Montesquiou, August 22, 1792; and “Conditions aux quelles
le sieur Cerf Dessaut [sic] s’oblige à fournir vingt mille chemises, dix mille chapeaux, dix mill[e] gibernes
et avec leurs bandriers, trois mille bandriers de sabres, et dix milles paires de guêtres pour le service de
l’armée du Midy,” September 3, 1792, 39 L 21.
38
“Conditions aux quelles le sieur Jacob Benjamin s’oblige à fournir trente deux mille aulnes de drap, pour
l’habillement de ce bataillon de Volontaire et Nationaux,” September 10, 1792.
39
“Chevaux. Armée du midi. Soumission,” September 21, 1792, 39 L 21. Cf. Archives Parlementaires,
vol. 53, 310.
40
Act of incorporation “par devant les notaires de Paris,” June 22, 1792, 39 L 21.
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In supplying French armies, Jewish entrepreneurs were continuing an Old Regime
practice. As early as 1698 an intendant of Metz wrote a memorandum justifying the
presence of Jews in part on the basis of their utility in providing cavalry horses and other
items to the French army. 41 Jay Berkovitz has found that the late eighteenth-century
records of the beit din of Metz include many cases relating to army provisioning
enterprises. 42 Yet the Revolution appears to have increased the opportunities for Jewish
army contractors by eliminating restrictions on Jewish mobility and augmenting the size
of the nation’s fighting force.

The Trial

The trial finally took place on January 22, 1793. The Archives départementales
du Rhône contain a printed record of the trial (box 39 L 60), though this document is a
form describing the procedure of all criminal trials, with sparse handwritten commentary.
Unfortunately it does not tell us what the lawyers, defendants or witnesses said. But the
form does contain important information. The trial began with Cozon, the president of
the tribunal, calling both Benjamin and Vincent to appear before the bench, “free and
without irons.” Afterwards the twelve jurors, sitting at the left of the judges, stood up
and Cozon administered “the oath prescribed by the Law” to them, to which they all said,
“I swear,” before returning to their seats. 43 “Citizen Reyre,” Vincent’s defense attorney,

41

Roger Clément, La condition des juifs de Metz sous l’ancien régime (Paris, 1903), 38-42.
Jay R. Berkovitz, “Acculturation and integration in eighteenth-century Metz,” Jewish History vol. 24, no.
3/4 (2010): 275.
43
The jurors were: Antoine Guilloud, Jean Brochet, Jean Baptiste Gagueur, François Lespinasse, Antoine
Gabriel Buisson, Pierre Bonnefoy, Pierre Gariot, Pierre Montfalcon, Jean Baptiste Barret, George Ramet,
Jean Deschenaud and Claude Vial. L’an second de la République, le vingt deux janvier mil sept cent
quatre-vingt treize les Juges du tribunal criminel, l’Accusateur public, étant dans l’auditoire du palais de
Justice, chacun à leur place [Lyon, 1793], 39 L 60.
42

and “Citizen Bret,” defending Benjamin, then took “the required oath.” Cozon asked
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each defendant his name, age, profession and place of residence, and the clerk recorded
their answers. The clerk then read the indictment.
Handwritten commentary on the printed record indicates that shirts from the
military storage facility were “shown to the accused and to the witnesses” who in turn
were asked “if they recognize[d] them.” Unfortunately, the record is silent on who the
witnesses were or what their (or the defendants’) responses were. The public prosecutor
and the defense attorneys addressed the court, though again we do not know what they
said. Finally Cozon “summarized the case” and gave the jury “written questions and all
the documents of the case, with the exception of declarations written by the witnesses.”
This was presumably standard procedure, since the quotations in the sentence above are
from the printed form, not the handwritten commentary. It is unrealistic to think that the
jurors could have read the more than two hundred pages of documentation in the file. No
doubt they were relying on Cozon’s having “summarized the case” for them.
By being authorized to compose a questionnaire for the jury, Cozon had a high
degree of influence. The questions he gave the jury, which are included in box 39 L 60 in
manuscript form, suggest that Cozon was sympathetic to Benjamin:

1st: Were the deals subscribed to by Jacob Benjamin fraudulent?
2nd: Is Jacob Benjamin convicted of fraud for concluding these
deals?
3rd: Did Jacob Benjamin, who is accused of having delivered shirts
and shoes of poor quality to the military magazines of Lyon,
deliver shoes?
4th: Did he deliver shirts?

5th: Were the shirts that were taken out of said magazines and
shown in the audience as exhibits of poor quality?
6th: Did these shirts come from deliveries made by Benjamin or by
his agents?
7th: In all of these cases is Jacob Benjamin convicted of the crime
of theft of the Republic’s funds, or was he on the basis of his
[illegible] deals subject to a civil action for their execution or
annulment? 44
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Then the jurors proceeded to their chamber for deliberation. According to an annotation
on the printed court record, the shirts were brought into the chamber. 45
The jury voted to acquit both Benjamin and Vincent. With respect to Benjamin,
their declaration affirmed:
“that Jacob Benjamin did not deliver shoes to the military magazines of Lyon,
that his agents made deliveries of shirts, that the shirts taken from the magazines
and exhibited in the audience are of poor quality, but that it is not certain whether
they come from deliveries made by Jacob Benjamin’s agents.
The jurors added “that Jacob Benjamin is not convicted of the crime of theft of the
Republic’s funds by reason of his deals and that he was only subject to civil actions
resulting from these deals and their execution.” 46

44

The verdict for Vincent also closely followed a questionnaire by Cozon that implicitly raised significant
doubts about the prosecution’s case. The questionnaire asked whether General Montesquiou and the three
deputies supervising the Army of the South (Lacombe-Saint-Michel, Gasparin and Rouyer) had approved
of the contracts with Benjamin. (The contracts themselves revealed that these authorities had approved of
the deals.) It also asked whether Vincent had signed any certificates accepting the “shirts and shoes of
poor quality,” an accusation he had vigorously denied. The prosecution had been unable to discover any
evidence to the contrary. The jurors therefore concluded that Vincent was “not at all convicted of having
favored the theft of the Republic’s funds by accepting supplies of shirts and shoes of poor quality, since it
is not established that he ever made any reception or acceptance of military effects.” “Jacques Vincent.
Jacob Benjamin. 22 Janvier 1793,” 39 L 60.
45
L’an second de la République, le vingt deux janvier…, 39 L 60.
46
“Jacques Vincent. Jacob Benjamin. 22 Janvier 1793,” 39 L 60.

Conclusions
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Jacob Benjamin turned up again in the records of the National Convention, but
this time he was not suspected of stealing public funds or endangering the Republic. On
the contrary, on September 20, 1792, a little less than nine months after he walked out of
the Maison de Justice in Lyon a free man, Benjamin was the subject of a letter from the
Minister of War, Jean Baptiste Noël Bouchotte, to the Convention, reporting a
contribution by the entrepreneur to the continuing war effort. Bouchotte wrote:
Citizen President [of the Convention],
I am forwarding to you a letter from Citizen Jacob
Benjamin by which he announces to me the gift that he made of
thirty tents in good condition, with their stakes and cords, and for
his brothers in arms of the Section of the Réunion [the militant
sans-culotte ward]. I ask you, Citizen President, to please pass it
on to the National Convention.
J. Bouchotte

The letter from Benjamin, written on September 18, read as follows:
Citizen Minister,
The duty of every good citizen is to contribute to the public
good, and even to make sacrifices, without looking at his means
and his abilities. I have the honor of sending you, citizen minister,
for my brothers in arms of the Section of the Réunion who are
ready to leave for the frontiers, thirty tents in good condition with
their stakes and cords, etc.
I desire that my brothers in arms return soon victorious to their
homes after having defeated our enemies.
I am very perfectly, Citizen Minister, your entirely
devotedcitizen.
Jacob Benjamin
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This contribution was given “honorable mention” by the Convention and reported
in its official bulletin. 47 It was a significant contribution. According to the contract for
tents that Benjamin had signed with Vincent on September 15, 1792, the price of tents
ranged from 136 to 410 livres, depending on their size. Even if the tents in the

subsequent patriotic gift had been the smallest size, thirty of them would have been worth
4080 livres, more than half the average annual income of a deputy. 48 But this was not the
last of Benjamin’s contributions. On 7 Frimaire Year II (November 27, 1793) Benjamin
announced to the sans-culottes of the Réunion section that he was making a gift of 50
tents for the war effort. He also gave coal, wood and wine to the poor-relief fund. The
section acknowledged his generosity with a “civic mention.” 49
I do not know what happened to Jacob Benjamin after November 1793. He is not
listed in the F7 series of dossiers on Terror victims at the Archives Nationales in Paris, so
he appears to have survived the Terror. 50 In any event, it is hard to imagine him having
been executed without any mention in the Archives Parlementaires or the press. So his is
a story with a happy ending, at least as far as I can determine. But what does it mean,
and why has it been forgotten?
Let me begin with the second question first. For the French historiography the
answer lies perhaps in the density of dramatic events during the fall of 1792 and the
winter of 1793. Benjamin’s deals with the Army of the South coincided with the fall of
the monarchy, the invasion of France by foreign forces and the September Massacres.

47

Archives Parlementaires, vol. 74, 513-4.
Tackett, Becoming a Revolutionary, 40.
49
I am very grateful to Colin Jones of Queen Mary University, London, for providing me with this
information in an email of March 20, 2014. Professor Jones found the relevant documentation in: Minutes
of the Réunion section, box F7* 2595, Archives Nationales, Paris.
50
Again I am grateful to Professor Jones for this information. Email from Colin Jones, March 20, 2014.
48

The Convention’s discussion of these deals took place against the backdrop of a much
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more contentious debate over the fate of the king. And Benjamin’s trial took place the
day after the king was executed. Under the circumstances it is unsurprising that his story
is absent from almost all accounts of the Revolution. As to the Jewish historiography, the
story of Jacob Benjamin does not fit well into widely-accepted understandings of the
emancipation, which has often been portrayed as a bargain in which Jews had to give up
something (communal autonomy, identity, tradition) in return for the elusive promises of
liberty and acceptance. Indeed, my own previous work has been informed by this
model. 51 Yet it is not clear what Benjamin had to give up. He grew up in Paris. He did
not belong to a kehilla that was in the process of being disbanded or that was burdened
with debts from the Old Regime. He called the sans-culottes of his neighborhood his
“brothers in arms,” and he cheerfully sold many thousands of pounds of pork with no
apparent pangs of conscience. The Revolution made him a citizen and also made him
very rich. It is true that he suffered the misfortune of imprisonment, but then he was
acquitted and soon in the favor of the highest authorities.
Why does Jacob Benjamin matter? At the most basic level, his significance lies
in the crucial but unacknowledged role he played in the survival of the Revolution. He
fed and clothed tens of thousands of its soldiers at a time when such logistical support
might have made the difference between victory and defeat. 52 But his story is also
significant for what it tells us about Jewish-French relations immediately following

51
Ronald Schechter, Obstinate Hebrews: Representations of Jews in France, 1715-1815 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2003).
52
On the importance of the relatively neglected study of logistics in military history see John A. Lynn,
“The History of Logistics and Supplying War,” in John A. Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western
Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 9-27. I am grateful to
Professor Julia Osman of Mississippi State University for bringing this source to my attention.

emancipation. Specifically, it is worth mentioning that the revolutionary government
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entrusted the vital task of feeding and clothing its armies to a Jew, and less than a year
after the emancipation. Furthermore, even though certain revolutionary leaders accused
him of serious crimes, antisemitism appears to have played a very small role in the case.
It is true that Cambon introduced the army supplier as “le juif Benjamin,” but he
was unusual in doing so. Almost every other reference to Benjamin in the Archives
Parlementaires, as well as in the court records, identified him as “le citoyen Benjamin,”
or (in pre-republican records) “le sieur Benjamin,” or simply “Jacob Benjamin.” 53 More
importantly still, no one in the Convention made the case that Benjamin was unpatriotic
because he was Jewish. One can imagine a scenario in which at least one deputy claimed
that it had been a mistake to emancipate the Jews, or even that Jews were taking
advantage of the generous revolutionary laws to profit at the expense of the brave soldiers
who were risking their lives for the principle of equality. After all, little more than a year
prior to Benjamin’s appearance at the bar of the Convention deputies had argued about
whether Jews were capable of citizenship. Yet no one even hinted at the need to revisit
emancipation. Deputy Jean-François Rewbell, who had argued vociferously against
Jewish political equality while serving in the Constituent Assembly in 1789 to 1791, was
present in the Convention during the discussion of Benjamin. He even spoke on
November 20, 1792, following the reading of the letter from Deputies Alquier, Boissy
53
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d’Anglas and Vitet accusing Benjamin of additional depredations. But he said nothing
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about Benjamin or the Jews in general. Rather he said that the war ministers were
ultimately responsible for any peculation in army contracts and that they should be
indicted. 54 Why antisemitism so quickly and dramatically disappeared from political
discourse is an interesting question, to which I do not have a ready answer, but for the
purposes of my argument it is sufficient to note that antisemitism is almost entirely absent
from the relevant political and judicial documentation.
If the twelve jurors in Lyon had been antisemitic, it is unlikely they would have
acquitted Benjamin, despite the coaching they appear to have received from Cozon.
Furthermore there is clearly no sign of antisemitism in Cozon, who actively resisted the
rush on behalf of the Convention to see Benjamin (and Vincent) punished.
To be sure, it is possible that political considerations motivated Cozon and the
jury, just as political considerations motivated the deputies who sought to prove that they
were good stewards of the nation’s resources. In this respect it may be relevant that the
trial of Benjamin and Vincent took place on January 22, 1793. On January 21, a much
more famous suspect had gone to the guillotine: Louis XVI. Though news of the event
may not have reached Lyon yet, the king had already been condemned to death on
January 17. Whether and to what extent the execution impacted Cozon or the jury in the
case of Benjamin and Vincent are matters of speculation. The execution of the king was
unpopular in the provinces, and perhaps the Lyonnais, in particular, were reluctant to give
the regicide Convention what it wanted in the case of Benjamin and Vincent. After all,
less than six months later Lyon, France’s second city, would be in rebellion against the
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Paris-based legislature. During that rebellion the Jacobin activist Joseph Chalier was
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executed, and the judge who presided over Chalier’s trial was none other than JeanBernard-François Cozon. 55
But the rivalry between Paris and Lyon does not explain Benjamin’s high
standing with the War Minister during the Terror or his warm relations with the sansculottes of the Réunion section. Clearly a wide range of revolutionaries believed that
Benjamin was good for the Republic. This does not prove that antisemitic opinion was
non-existent among republican legislators, officials and activists, but any such opinion
failed to resonate or to affect Benjamin’s standing adversely.
It is hard not to read the Benjamin Affair in juxtaposition to the Dreyfus Affair a century
later. In the Dreyfus Affair, a man who was manifestly innocent was widely seen as
guilty simply because he was Jewish. In the Benjamin Affair, a man whose innocence
was less obvious (at what point does an army contractor become a war profiteer?) was
nevertheless acquitted and even honored as an extraordinary patriot despite being Jewish;
in other words, despite belonging to a long-scorned group in French society. Of course,
judicially the two cases were very different. Dreyfus was tried by a military court and
Benjamin by a civil court. But in terms of public opinion, the Benjamin case had the
same potential to provoke accusations of treason as the Dreyfus case, if not more, since
France was fighting for its survival in the fall of 1792 but not in the 1890s. Yet there
were no street demonstrations against Benjamin or ‘the Jews,’ and there was no looting
of Jewish businesses. Public opinion in 1792 and 1793 was famously susceptible to
conspiracy fears, but none of these seem to have prominently featured the Jews, despite
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the publicity of the Benjamin case. 56 Anyone who would cite the Dreyfus Affair as
evidence of a supposed propensity to antisemitism among the French must also reckon
with the Benjamin Affair.
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